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HENSON V. INTERNATIONAL PAPER Co.:
A STEP BACKWARDS IN SOUTH CAROLINA ATTRACTIVE
NUISANCE JURISPRUDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 25, 1998, ten-year-old Terry Henson (Terry) and three other boys
entered International Paper Company's (IPC) property in the City of Georgetown.'
IPC operates a twenty-seven mile canal on this piece of land and uses several
pumping stations to aid in water flow.2 This water eventually finds its way to the
Church Street pumping station in the City of Georgetown where it is sent
underground through piping at 19,000 gallons per minute.' The canal is mostly
unfenced and is easily accessible via dirt maintenance roads.4 No signs forbidding
trespassing or warning of the dangers associated with the canal are erected.'
The boys entered the land on one of the maintenance roads to see a "dirt
jumping hill."6 After viewing the hill, they went to the adjacent canal where each
of them walked over a pipe spanning the canal's water to the other side.7 Terry
decided to enter the water holding on to one end of a cast net the boys found; the
other three boys held the other end.' While in the water, Terry attempted to grab
the metal bracings on the pipe he traversed earlier.9 The ten-year-old slipped, the
other boys were unable to hold onto the net, and Terry drowned under the forceful
pull of the Church Street pumping station.'0 At the time of Terry's death, IPC knew
of at least three other people who drowned in the canal."
Terry's mother brought an action for wrongful death alleging, inter alia, that
she was entitled to recover against IPC under the attractive nuisance doctrine. 2 The
trial judge granted a directed verdict for IPC on the attractive nuisance issue and
submitted the plaintiff's negligence cause of action to the jury. 3 The jury found
Terry 75% at fault and IPC 25% at fault, resulting in a judgment for defendant
IPC.'" Terry's mother appealed. 5 In a 2-1 decision, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial verdict.'
6 Judge Anderson dissented.' 7
1. Henson v. Int'l Paper Co., 358 S.C. 133, 136, 594 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Ct. App. 2004).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Henson v. Int'l Paper Co., 358 S.C. 133, 136, 594 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Ct. App. 2004).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 136, 594 S.E.2d at 501.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 135, 594 S.E.2d at 500.
13. Henson v. Int'l Paper Co., 358 S.C. 133, 136, 594 S.E.2d 499, 501 (Ct. App. 2004).
14. Id. at 137, 594 S.E.2d at 501.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 143, 594 S.E.2d at 504.
17. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine in the United States
The attractive nuisance doctrine has its roots in England in the 1840s," with
American courts first applying the doctrine in the 1870's. 9 The early cases were
often referred to as "turntable cases" because early decisions centered on the same
factual scenario: children sustaining injuries while playing on railroad lines'
unlocked turntables.20 The doctrine's name eventually evolved to "attractive
nuisance":
The courts decided that when a landholder sets before young
children a temptation that he has reason to believe will lead them
into danger, he must use ordinary care to protect them from
harm ....
On the basis of the turntable decisions, the doctrine acquired
the misleading name "attractive nuisance." The word "nuisance"
was used because of a supposed analogy to conditions dangerous
to children outside the premises. The word "attractive" was
applied because courts regarded it as essential that the child be
lured or enticed onto the premises."
In 1922, the United States Supreme Court decided UnitedZinc & Chemical Co.
v. Britt.22 The Court held that a child could not recover under the attractive
nuisance doctrine when he was not lured onto the defendant's property by the
instrumentality causing his injury.23 Britt served as the majority rule in the United
States for a little over a decade, but its acceptance by courts quickly declined.24 In
1934, the Restatement of Torts rejected Britt's reasoning outright by adopting
section 339.2 Section 339, which afforded a child "much of the protection of [the]
ordinary negligence doctrine, proved to be one of the most well received sections
of the Torts Restatements.27 Under section 339, a child no longer had to prove that
his initial trespass was caused by the instrumentality that would ultimately cause his
injury.
28
In 1965, the Restatement (Second) of Torts republished section 339 with only
minor changes.29 Prosser and Keeton stated, "[s]ection 339,.. has been cited so
frequently, and has received such general acceptance on the part of the courts, that
it has become the new point of departure."3 o Now, in most states, instead of looking
to the child's attraction to the instrumentality causing the harm, the courts will
18. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 59, at 400 (5th ed. 1984) (citing
Lynch v. Nurdin, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (Q.B. 1841) as the doctrine's beginning).
19. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 496 (10th ed. 2000).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 258 U.S. 268 (1922).
23. Id. at 275-76.
24. KEETON, supra note 18, at 401-02. It may have been overruled. Id. at 401 & n.14.
25. Id. at 402.
26. Id. at 401-02.
27. Id. at 402.
28. Id.
29. KEETON, supra note 18, at 402.
30. Id. at 402.
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decide whether the child's harm was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant in
deciding whether to award recovery.3" Since a majority of courts have now adopted
a negligence standard in attractive nuisance cases, it appears that the doctrine's title
has become both misleading and fictitious.32
B. The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine in South Carolina and Henson
South Carolina started applying the attractive nuisance doctrine shortly after its
arrival in the United States. The doctrine's first application is found in Bridger v.
Asheville & Spartanburg Railroad Co.,33 a railroad turntable case.34 The South
Carolina Supreme Court did not use the words attractive nuisance or identify the
turntable doctrine by name, but from its analysis it is clear that this was the law
being applied.35
South Carolina appellate courts decided approximately fifteen attractive
nuisance cases from Bridger in 1886 until Byrd v. Melton36 in 1972. Since Byrd,
no attractive nuisance cases were reported until a split South Carolina Court of
Appeals decided Henson in 2004. In the time between Bridger and Henson, it is not
evident that South Carolina courts followed the national trends outlined in Part II.A.
above. After 1922 South Carolina cases cite Britt only once, and it is in a
dissenting opinion.3y Further, since the national shift away from Britt and towards
section 339, the South Carolina Supreme Court has mentioned the much-heralded
section only in passing.3 No reported cases show a South Carolina court using
section 339 as a starting point for an attractive nuisance analysis.
After a thirty-year hiatus, it appears that Henson has successfully revived
discussion of this long-dormant doctrine. The thrust of the disagreement between
the majority and dissent centers on the historical development of the attractive
nuisance doctrine in South Carolina.3 9 The majority opinion suggests that the rule
in Britt, though not cited by name, is clearly the law of the state and that Terry was
properly denied recovery by the trial court since he was not attracted to the
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: ARTIFICIAL CONDITIONS HIGHLY DANGEROUS TO
TRESPASSING CHILDREN § 339 (1965).
32. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 496-97.
33. 25 S.C. 24 (1886).
34. Id. at 25.
35. Testimony presented that "the turn-table was a dangerous machine; that... was... located
in an exposed place, easily accessible, unguarded, unfenced, and unlocked; and that the plaintiff was
of [the] age when he was incapable of... appreciating his danger." Id. at 29.
36. 259 S.C. 271, 191 S.E.2d 515 (1972).
37. Hart v. Union Mfg. & Power Co., 157 S.C. 174, 202, 154 S.E. 118, 125 (1930) (Conthran,
J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., Byrd, 259 S.C. at 276, 191 S.E.2d at 517 (citing section 339, among other sources,
for the proposition that "liability is imposed on a landowner for physical harm to trespassing children
only where the injury is caused by an artificial condition upon the land."); Lynch v. Motel Enters., Inc.,
248 S.C. 490, 495-96, 151 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1966) (stating that "[wle are satisfied that the evidence
was sufficient to have warranted an inference that [injured child] was attracted by the pool.
However ... this is not a prerequisite to recovery under the law of this case. Furthermore, the
'attraction' theory, which has been discredited in most jurisdictions, is of little practical
importance... .") (citation omitted); Everett v. White, 245 S.C. 331, 338, 140 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1965)
(citing section 339 in the last sentence of the decision: "[w]e are satisfied that the complaint states a
cause of action against the defendant based upon actionable negligence independent[] of... attractive
nuisance. In addition to our own decisions which have been cited see... Restatement of Torts, Sec.
339.").
39. Henson v. Int'l Paper Co., 358 S.C. 133, 139-40, 149-57, 594 S.E.2d 499, 502, 507-11 (Ct.
App. 2004) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
2005]
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defendant's property by the canal that caused his death. Judge Anderson's dissent
casts doubt on the majority's reasoning in a number of ways, espciallyby discussing
the doctrine's evolution in South Carolina.4 Judge Anderson advocates the
bifurcation of the doctrine. He believes a child may be on the defendant'sproperty
for any reason and subsequently attracted to a dangerous instrumentality.' If that
instrumentality constitutes an attractive nuisance and the child is injured by it, the
child should be allowed recovery under state common law.43
This Note analyzes the majority opinion in Part HI. Part IV discusses Judge
Anderson's dissent. While analyzing the dissent's points of contention, other
considerations such as practicality and South Carolina public policy are noted. This
Note aims to not only address the strengths and weaknesses of each side's position
as they relate to South Carolina's modem common law, but also to suggest a
pragmatic solution to the newly-discovered schism over the state's attractive
nuisance jurisprudence.
III. THE HENSON MAJORITY
The Henson majority held the attractive nuisance doctrine was not applicable
and disposed of the issue quickly." In a single paragraph, the court held that the
trial court's directed verdict as to the cause of action for attractive nuisance was
proper, as "[s]ettled law supports what the trial judge did." 5 The majority further
held that since Terry "was not attracted to [IPC's] premises by reason of the
canal," and since "[t]he attractive nuisance doctrine 'is not applicable where the
injured child went to the dangerous situation for some other reason,""'7 the trial
court's determination was correct.' The majority's conclusions about the attractive
nuisance doctrine are based on the South Carolina Supreme Court case Kirven v.
Askins.49
The majority's efficient disposal of the attractive nuisance doctrine in Henson
indicates the doctrine's applicability is anon-contentious issue. From the majority's
discussion, South Carolina case law, lead by Kirven, seems to directly support the
conclusion that the rule in Britt still applies in South Carolina. After reviewing
Judge Anderson's dissent, however, the majority's holding appears to be anything
but straightforward and the supporting case law looks as if it is not so well-settled.
40. Id. at 139-40, 594 S.E.2d at 502.
41. Id. at 149-57, 594 S.E.2d at 507-11 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 154, 594 S.E.2d at 510 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 139-40, 594 S.E.2d at 502.
45. Henson v. Int'l Paper Co., 358 S.C. 133, 139, 594 S.E.2d 499, 502 (Ct. App. 2004).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 139-40, 594 S.E.2d at 502 (quoting Kirven v. Askins, 253 S.C. 110, 117, 169 S.E.2d
139, 142 (1969)).
48. Id. at 139, 594 S.E.2d at 502.
49. See id. at 139-40, 594 S.E.2d at 502. The relevant portion of Kirven cites Hancock v. Aiken
Mills, Inc., 180 S.C. 93, 185 S.E. 188 (1936).
[Vol. 56:835
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IV. JUDGE ANDERSON'S DISSENT
A. An Overview
The dissent attacks the majority's statement of the law of attractive nuisance.50
In the dissent's opinion, a child need not be attracted to the defendant's property by
the instrumentality that causes harm.5 Instead, Judge Anderson reasons, it is
enough that a child sustains an injury in his intermeddling with the defendant's
dangerous instrumentality, as long as the child is attracted to the instrumentality
causing harm.52 In short, Judge Anderson does not believe that South Carolina has
ever followed the rule in Britt, nor does he believe it should.53
Judge Anderson focuses on whether he was attracted to the instrumentality
causing injury once on the property rather than how the child arrived on the
defendant's property.54 The dissent supports its position in a number of ways. First,
it calls into question the Hancock decision.55 Second, the dissent disputes the state
of the attractive nuisance doctrine in the time leading up to, and following,
Hancock.6 Lastly, the dissent portrays the doctrine, as enunciated in Hancock, as
conflicted. 57 An analysis of the dissent's argument and policy considerations shows
that here, Judge Anderson got it right.
B. The Rule in Hancock as Mere Dicta
The dissent first attacks the majority's reasoning by attacking the case law
purportedly supporting its position."' The dissent attacks the majority's use of
Kirven arguing that Kirven erroneously applied principles from Hancock v. Aiken
Mills, Inc." Judge Anderson believes the Hancock court already "disposed of the
attractive nuisance issue"6 by looking to Sexton v. Noll Construction Co.,6 and the
rest of the opinion was dicta eventually used in the Kirven opinion.62 Thus, the
dissent believes the Kirven court incorrectly applied what amounted to dicta from
the Hancock case. Since the attractive nuisance issue was already decided, the
dissent reasons that any extraneous principles proffered in Sexton relating to the
doctrine should not be given effect in subsequent decisions. 63 The dissent reasons
that since the Kirven court was in error, so too was the Henson majority." An in-
depth analysis of the Hancock court's reasoning is necessary to determine whether
the Kirven court, and thus the Henson majority, erroneously applied South
Carolina's attractive nuisance doctrine.
50. Id. at 147-57, 594 S.E.2d at 504-11 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
51. Henson v. Int'l Paper Co., 358 S.C. 133, 154, 594 S.E.2d 499, 510 (Ct. App. 2004)
(Anderson, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 154-55, 594 S.E.2d at 510 (Anderson, J.,. dissenting).
53. Id. at 153, 594 S.E.2d at 509 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 154-55, 594 S.E.2d at 510 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 152-53, 594 S.E.2d at 508-09 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 153-55, 594 S.E.2d at 509-10 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
57. Henson v. Int'l Paper Co,, 358 S.C. 133, 156, 594 S.E.2d 499, 511 (Ct. App. 2004)
(Anderson, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 151-53, 594 S.E.2d at 508-09 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
59. 180 S.C. 93, 185 S.E. 188 (1936).
60. Henson, 358 S.C. at 152, 594 S.E.2d at 509 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
61. 108 S.C. 516, 95 S.E. 129 (1918).
62. Henson, 358 S.C. at 152, 594 S.E.2d at 509 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Id.
2005] TORT LAW
5
Tonnsen: Henson v. International Paper Co.: A Step Backwards in South Caro
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In Hancock, the defendant's employees started a fire to keep warm, which
burned the plaintiff, a twelve-year-old child.65 The plaintiff lived in the defendant's
mill village where his parent's worked.66 The plaintiff ventured outside his home
to get some water, and one of the defendant's employees sent the plaintiff on an
errand.67 Upon returning from the errand, the plaintiff stood in front of the fire with
the employees.68 While standing there, the plaintiffs clothing ignited, causing
severe bums on both legs.69
After resolving the issue of agency, the court turned to the defendant's
contention that the attractive nuisance doctrine did not apply.7° The court makes it
clear that the child "was not attracted by the fire itself, but went to it only because
[the defendant's employee] called him there on a mission...."" In the early stages
of its analysis, the court hints that this fact may be fatal to the plaintiffs cause of
action since in all previous successful attractive nuisance cases "the child that was
injured or killed was attracted to play with or play in or swim in, or wade in, the
instrumentality that brought about its injury or death."' The court confirms that the
attractive nuisance doctrine is recognized in South Carolina,73 and then turns to an
analysis of Sexton v. Noll Construction Co.74
In Sexton, a child was playing on a sand hill on the defendant's property when
he came in contact with a boiling pot of asphalt, causing injuries.75 The Hancock
court recounted the reasoning of the Sexton court in denying the child's recovery:
The Court held, however, that inasmuch as the child was not
attracted by the pot of asphalt but by the sand pile alone, the
doctrine of attractive nuisances did not apply, and that the plaintiff
could not recover. The Court said... "The plaintiff, however,
was not playing with the pot at the time of the injury".. [t]he
defendant cannot be held liable under such circumstances ....
The Hancock court then drew a parallel between Sexton and the case at bar:
"[E]ven if the fire should be treated as an attractive nuisance-and we cannot so
hold-the lure of the fire was not the thing that attracted the plaintiff."' Judge
Anderson reasoned in Henson that the Sexton decision was based "on the lack of
attraction to the instrumentality causing injury, not that the child was on the
property for another reason. 78 The Henson dissent believes that Hancock was
decided on the same grounds.
Though the passage from Hancock seems to support the dissent's position that
"the reasoning of Sexton disposed of the attractive nuisance issue," Judge Anderson
acknowledges that after this disposal, "the Hancock Court cited authorities from
65. Hancock v. Aiken Mills, Inc., 180 S.C. 93, 95, 185 S.E. 188, 189 (1936).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 96, 185 S.E. at 189.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 100, 185 S.E. at 191.
71. Hancock v. Aiken Mills, Inc., 180 S.C. 93, 100,185 S.E. 188, 191 (1936).
72. Id. at 102, 185 S.E. at 192.
73. Id.
74. 108 S.C. 516, 95 S.E. 129 (1918).
75. Id. at 519, 95 S.E. at 130.
76. Hancock, 180 S.C. at 103, 185 S.E. at 193 (quotingSexton, 108 S.C. at 522, 95 S.E. at 131).
77. Id.
78. Henson v. Int'l Paper Co., 358 S.C. 133, 152,594 S.E.2d 499,509 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 56: 835
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other jurisdictions in support of its conclusion."79 It is the principle put forth in
these cases, that "unless the child goes on the property by reason of the temptation
of the very instrumentality, which is held to be the attractive nuisance, he cannot
recover, that supports the Henson majority's decision. This portion of the
Hancock court's analysis essentially states the rule in Britt from 1922." With
varying degrees of conviction, the nine cases cited in Hancock require the child to
be attracted to the defendant's property by the instrumentality causing his harm in
order for him to recover.82 The crux of the dissent's argument is that these cases
were inserted after the decision on the attractive nuisance doctrine was already
rendered and should thus be given little effect."3 However, it is apparent that the
Hancock court uses the Sexton decision and these cases from other jurisdictions to
reach a final conclusion on the applicability of the doctrine:
Applying the principles announced in [the nine cases from
other jurisdictions] and in our own cases to the facts here, it is
perfectly clear that this fire, built by the workmen of the
defendant, did not constitute an attractive nuisance. The facts do
not make the doctrine of attractive nuisance remotely applicable.
There is not the slightest evidence that the plaintiff was drawn to
the fire by any childish proclivity for play or amusement, or
impelled thereto by any childish instinct.
Therefore, it appears that the dissent is not entirely correct when it states that
the Hancock court disposed of the attractive nuisance doctrine through Sexton. The
better analysis is that the court used Sexton as the primary basis for its decision, but
backed up its findings with out-of-state case law using the rule in Britt. A careful
reading of Hancock supports this proposition since the court does not state that "a
verdict should have been directed for the defendant" on the attractive nuisance
doctrine until after it connects Sexton and the other cases in a preceding paragraph."
However, the dissent may be correct in its other attacks on Hancock, especially
its belief that the authority from the other jurisdictions "was not necessary to the
decision in the case."86 This is distinct from the argument that the issue of attractive
nuisance was already disposed of. While the disposal of the issue relates more to
the order of the Hancock court's analysis, the necessity of applying the outside case
law relates to what the established law was in South Carolina in the time leading up
the supreme court's 1918 decision. If the supreme court already decided prior to
Hancock that the attractiveness of the instrumentality is the key question to be
decided, then Hancock's holding that the fire was not attractive makes the question
of how the child arrived on the property where the fire was located irrelevant. Thus,
although the dissent's proposition that the Hancock court already disposed of the
attractive nuisance issue through Sexton appears to be questionable, an analysis of
79. Id.
80. Hancock v. Aiken Mills, Inc., 180 S.C. 93, 104, 185 S.E. 188, 193 (1936) (emphasis added).
This portion of Hancock is the same portion that Kirven cites. That portion of Kirven in turn becomes
the basis for the majority and the dissent's disagreement.
81. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
82. Hancock, 180 S.C. at 104, 185 S.E. at 193.
83. Henson v. Int'l Paper Co., 358 S.C. 133, 152, 594 S.E.2d 499, 509 (Ct. App. 2004)
(Anderson, J., dissenting).
84. Hancock, 180 S.C. at 104, 185 S.E. at 193.
85. Id. at 105, 185 S.E.2d at 193.
86. Henson, 358 S.C. at 152, 594 S.E.2d at 509 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
2005] TORT LAW
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South Carolina case law in the time surrounding Hancock may prove instructive on
the dissent's argument that the outside authority was "not necessary to the
decision."87
C. Pre-Hancock & Post-Hancock Cases as Conflicting with the Rule in Britt
The dissent argues that "[p]re-Hancock cases demonstrate and post-Hancock
cases confirm South Carolina has never been one of the few jurisdictions which
adhere to [the rule found in Hancock and Britt]."88  The dissent faces an obvious
uphill battle, as the disputed language from Hancock was used in Kirven and cited
by the majority."9 Nonetheless, it appears that the dissent may be correct, as few
South Carolina courts have inquired as to how the child came upon the defendant's
property in attractive nuisance cases in the years leading up to, and following,
Hancock.
1. Pre-Hancock Case Law
Starting with Bridger v. Asheville & Spartanburg Railroad Co.," South
Carolina courts analyzed the attractive nuisance doctrine in seven reported cases9
before Hancock. The Bridger case, decided in 1886, does little more than
acknowledge that the attractive nuisance doctrine exists in South Carolina.92 There
is no in-depth analysis into the intricacies of the doctrine, and little would be gained
from an analysis of the case here.
Notwithstanding Bridger, the dissent's analysis of pre-Hancock cases reveals
a common argument: In the time leading up to the Hancock decision, South
Carolina courts did not consider a child's reason for being on a defendant's property
in deciding whether to award recovery under the attractive nuisance doctrine. 9 The
dissent's assertion appears supported. Before 1936, the outcomes differed, as did
the issues the South Carolina Supreme Court deemed relevant. For example, over
a fifty-year stint, the court questioned whether a child was capable of appreciating
the danger of a tumtable, 9 whether a reservoir played upon a child's "'childish
instincts and impulses,"' 95 whether an open window 96 or a pond97 could constitute
87. Id.
88. Id. at 153, 594 S.E.2d at 509 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 139-40, 594 S.E.2d at 502.
90. 25 S.C. 24 (1886).
91. In addition to Bridger, there are six other cases: Hart v. Union Manufacturing & Power Co.,
157 S.C. 174, 154 S.E. 118 (1930), Renno v. Seaboard AirLine Railway, 120 S.C. 7, 112 S.E. 439
(1922), Sexton v. Noll Construction Co., 108 S.C. 516, 95 S.E. 129 (1918), McLendon v. Hampton
Cotton Mills, 109 S.C. 238, 95 S.E. 781 (1917), Hayes v. Southern Power Co., 95 S.C. 230, 78 S.E.
956 (1913) and Franks v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 78 S.C. 10, 58 S.E. 960 (1907).
92. Bridger, 25 S.C. at 24.
93. The dissent's phraseology and conclusions with respect to these cases are consistent. Judge
Anderson commented on Franks: "[The] decision did not depend on whether the child was actually
attracted to the property on which he was injured"; on Hayes: "[tihe decision does not question why
the injured child was on the property of the defendant"; on Hart: "[tlhere was no evidence the child was
attracted to the defendant's property because of the existence of the dangerous tower itself"; and on
Sexton: "[t]he Court based its decision on the lack of attraction to the instrumentality causing injury,
not that the child was on the property for another reason." Henson, 358 S.C. at 151-52, 594 S.E.2d
at 508 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
94. Bridger, 25 S.C. at 32.
95. Franks, 78 S.C. at 18, 58 S.E. at 962.
96. Hayes, 95 S.C. 230,78 S.E. 956.
97. Renno, 120 S.C. 7, 112 S.E. 439.
[Vol. 56:835
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an attractive nuisance, whether a fence erected by a defendant was a sufficient
safeguard," whether a child was playing with a dangerous instrumentality at the
time of his injury,99 and whether a defendant had constructive notice of children
playing on its property."° While each of these different inquiries proved pivotal in
deciding whether to award recovery in these particular cases, none of these
decisions hinged on the test enunciated by Britt, Hancock, and Henson. That is to
say, no pre-Hancock South Carolina court investigated the child's motivation for
entering the defendant's property when deciding the applicability of the attractive
nuisance doctrine.
2. Post-Hancock Case Law
The support garnered for the dissent's argument from pre-Hancock case law
loses ground in post-Hancock cases. Although the dissent asserts that "post-
Hancock cases confirm South Carolina has never been one of the few jurisdictions
which adhere to [the rule in Britt],"' O' at least two cases applying South Carolina
law have held to the contrary. 2
The dissent's first obstacle is Kirven, the case cited by the majority. In Kirven,
the defendant was constructing a building that was to become the city hall of
Darlington.' Dirt clods were prevalent on the land where the construction was
taking place."° The plaintiff was at the Darlington Recreational Center (Center),
located on adjacent property on the day of his injury."0 5 The director of the Center
told another boy to enter the defendant's construction site to retrieve two children
who wandered there. " The plaintiff accompanied the other boys and while on the
property a thrown dirt clod hit the plaintiff in the eye."0 7
In analyzing the plaintiff's claim, the Kirven court first held that the dirt clods
on the construction site were "not a dangerous thing or instrumentality as is required
to establish liability under ... the attractive nuisance doctrine... ,"08 The court
continued:
In order that liability may be imposed under the attractive
nuisance doctrine it is necessary that the condition or
instrumentality which caused the injury, should have actually
attracted the child into danger .... In Hancock. . ., we held that
unless the child goes on the property by reason of the temptation
of the very instrumentality, which is held to be the attractive
nuisance, he cannot recover. Here, the appellant was not attracted
98. McLendon v. Hampton Cotton Mills, 109 S.C. 238, 95 S.E. 781 (1917).
99. Sexton, 108 S.C. 516, 95 S.E. 129.
100. Hart v. Union Mfg. & Power Co., 157 S.C. 174, 154 S.E. 118 (1930).
101. Henson v. Int'l Paper Co., 358 S.C. 133, 153, 594 S.E.2d 499, 509 (Anderson, J.,
dissenting).
102. See Kirven v. Askins, 253 S.C. 110, 117, 169 S.E.2d 139, 142 (1969); Miller v. Perry, 308
F. Supp. 863, 865 (D.S.C. 1970).
103. Kirven, 253 S.C. at 113, 169 S.E.2d at 140.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 114, 169 S.E.2d at 140.
108. Kirven v. Askins, 253 S.C. 110, 117, 169 S.E.2d 139, 142 (1969).
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to the premises of the respondent by reason of the presence
thereon of either the pile of dirt or clods of clay."o
The Henson majority bases its decision on this portion of the analysis citing
Hancock."0 Judge Anderson attacks Kirven by claiming that its application of
Hancock is not a "correct interpretation of the law of attractive nuisance as it has
developed in South Carolina." ' Pr
The second post-Hancock case to apply the disputed test was Miller v. Perry,"2
decided by the District Court for the District of South Carolina. Notably, neither
the majority nor the dissent in Henson cited this case." 3 In Miller, the court applied
South Carolina law in deciding whether the attractive nuisance applied."" Three
brothers ventured onto the defendant's property."' While on the property, two of
the brothers drowned attempting to board a boat located in one of the defendant's
ponds.' 6 The court recounted how the brothers were drawn to the defendant's
property:
[One of the brothers] testified that he and his [brothers]
walked up the Hartford Road because they heard a bulldozer on
J. C. Nichols's place and that when they came to the lane leading
to defendant's farm, they decided to see what was down there.
They did not know that defendant had any fish ponds and they
could not see the ponds until they went almost .4 mile from the
Hartford Road."
7
In analyzing South Carolina's attractive nuisance law, the district court noted
Kirven, opining that it "reiterated the rule laid down in Hancock.. ., that unless the
child goes on the property by reason of the temptation of the very instrumentality,
which is held to be the attractive nuisance, he cannot recover."" Although the
Miller court ultimately consulted the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 339 in
making its final decision on the doctrine's applicability," its acknowledgment of
the rule in Hancock, and of Kirven's reiteration of that rule, carries some weight in
determining the direction of post-Hancock case law. In fact, Kirven's
acknowledgment of the rule in Hancock, and Miller's assertion that the Kirven
decision reiterated the rule in Hancock could indicate that the Henson dissent's
argument against the rule in Britt is without merit. However, case law beyond
Kirven andMiller shows Judge Anderson's analysis ofpost-Hancocklaw may serve
as the more convincing interpretation.
109. Id. (citation omitted).
110. See Henson v. Int'l Paper Co., 358 S.C. 133, 139-40,594 S.E.2d 499,502 (CL App. 2004).
111. Id. at 154, 594 S.E.2d at 510 (Anderson, J., dissenting). Judge Anderson supports his view
by showing the contrariety of the proffered law in Kirven. This argument will be analyzed infra at Part
IV.D.
112. 308 F. Supp. 863 (D.S.C. 1970).
113. See Henson, 358 S.C. 133, 594 S.E.2d 499.
114. Miller, 308 F. Supp. at 865.
115. Id. at 864.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 866 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
119. Miller v. Perry, 308 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D.S.C. 1970). The district court, purportedly
applying South Carolina state law, used section 339 in its analysis of the attractive nuisance doctrine.
Id. In using section 339 as the basis for its decision, the district court did something that no South
Carolina court has ever done. See also supra Part II.B.
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TORT LAW
Outside of Miller and Kirven, three South Carolina cases analyzing the
attractive nuisance doctrine were decided afterHancock.20 Arguably, each of these
cases supports Judge Anderson's position inHenson. Notably, none of these cases
explicitly mentions Hancock.
The Henson dissent cites Perrin v. Rainwater,'2' decided two years after
Hancock, as supporting the position that a child need not be attracted to the
premises of the defendant by reason of the instrumentality causing his injury. 22 In
Perrin, a seven-year-old child died when she fell from a fire escape located on the
third floor of the defendant's building. 23 Perhaps the most important part of the
Perrin decision is that the child was on the defendant's property because "she was
a pupil of a dance school kept by [defendant]" and fell "while attending the dance
school.' 2 4 If the South Carolina Supreme Court in Perrin applied the rule from
Hancock and Britt, it would have denied recovery.
Daniels v. Timmons, 2' another case cited by the dissent, also allowed recovery
when a child clearly was not attracted to the property due to the nuisance causing
injury. The child was injured when he fell from the second floor of the defendant's
apartment building.126 The fall occurred as a result of "several wickets or uprights
[that] were missing on the front part [of the porch], so that there was an opening
which was left unguarded and dangerous. 12'The court allowed recovery under a
theory of attractive nuisance even though the child was on the property because he
lived there with his parents. 2s Again, if the court applied the Hancock or Britt rule,
recovery would have been denied.
Judge Anderson also cites Lynch v. Motel Enterprises, Inc. 29 as support for his
conclusion. In this case, a "seven year old, mentally defective child" drowned in
the defendant hotel's swimming pool. 3° The case proceeded on two theories of
recovery, one of which was attractive nuisance.' 3' In holding that the swimming
pool constituted an attraction, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of
defendant's judgment notwithstanding the verdict and directed verdict motions. '32
Interestingly, the court did not inquire into the reason for the child's presence on the
120. Lynch v. Motel Enters., Inc., 248 S.C. 490, 151 S.E.2d 435 (1966); Daniels v. Tinmons,
216 S.C. 539, 59 S.E.2d 149 (1950); Perrin v. Rainwater, 186 S.C. 181, 195 S.E. 283 (1938). The
South Carolina Supreme Court also decided Bush v. Aiken Electric Cooperative, 226 S.C. 442, 85
S.E.2d 716 (1955) and Everett v. White, 245 S.C. 331, 582 S.E.2d 582 (1965), in the time after
Hancock. While in Bush the plaintiff's claim was based on the attractive nuisance doctrine, the
supreme court's decision hinged on charitable immunity; attractive nuisance was not an issue on appeal.
Bush, 226 S.C. at 444, 85 S.E.2d at 717. Everett verifies that South Carolina recognizes an alternative
theory of recovery that parallels the attractive nuisance doctrine. Everett, 245 S.C. at 335, 140 S.E.2d
at 584.
121. 186 S.C. 181, 195 S.E. 283 (1938).
122. Henson v. Int'l Paper Co., 358 S.C. 133, 153, 594 S.E.2d 499, 509 (CL App. 2004)
(Anderson, J., dissenting).
123. Perrin, 186 S.C. at 182, 195 S.E. at 283.
124. Id.
125. 216 S.C. 539, 59 S.E.2d 149 (1950).
126. Id. at 550-51, 59 S.E.2d at 155.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 551, 59 S.E.2d at 155.
129. 248 S.C. 490, 151 S.E.2d 435 (1966).
130. Id. at 492, 59 S.E.2d at 435.
131. Id. at 493, 59 S.E.2d at 436. The second theory was based on a premise's liability tort
developed under Everett v. White, 245 S.C. 331,140 S.E.2d 582 (1965), and Franks v. Southern Cotton
Oil Co., 78 S.C. 10, 58 S.E. 960 (1907).
132. Id. at 495-96, 59 S.E.2d at 437.
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property, nor discuss whether members of the child's family were guests at thehotel. t3
3. Conflicting Conclusions
In conclusion, the dissent's argument inHenson that "South Carolina has never
been one of the few jurisdictions [to] adhere" to the Britt rule134 is an overstatement.
The supreme court, although inconsistent in deciding what factors were relevant in
allowing recovery before Hancock, never ventured into an inquiry of how a child
arrived on the defendant's property. 3 Further support of the dissent's position is
the fact that the supreme court did not make this inquiry in a time when that
"position had considerable acceptance,"' 36 between the Britt decision in 1922 and
the Hancock decision in 1936.
Judge Anderson's position meets some resistance from cases decided after
Hancock. At least two cases applying South Carolina law after 1936 found the
reason for a child's venture onto the defendant's property as relevant to the
attractive nuisance claim."37 Further, these cases cited Hancock and yet denied
recovery to a child injured on the defendant's property by an object not causing the
attraction. 3 The facts in Miller are particularly close to those in Henson, and the
Miller court went out of its way to reject the bifurcation theory.'39
Some post-Hancock law, however, does support the dissent's position." In
fact, in terms of sheer numbers, three cases support Judge Anderson's position
whereas two support the Henson majority.' 4" The two cases that support the
dissent's position, Perrin and Daniels, are telling, as those cases involve the child's
presence on the defendant's property by something other than the object causing the
injury.1
Nonetheless, the majority's position may, on balance, have more support since
the cases supporting its position occurred after Hancock. More importantly, Kirven
and Miller were decided in 1969 and 1970, after Perrin, Timmons, and Lynch-the
cases upon which the dissent draws its support. 4 1 Under stare decisis, one could
argue that the trend in South Carolina is towards the position enunciated by the
Henson majority. A somewhat weaker argument exists that Kirven, decided in
1969, actually overruled the supreme court in Perrin, Timmons, and Lynch. Calling
the late cases a trend or settled law in South Carolina would be a stretch since these
cases were decided over thirty years ago, and modem courts generally reject the
133. Lynch v. Motel Enters., Inc., 248 S.C. 490, 151 S.E.2d 435 (1966).
134. Henson v. Int'l Paper Co., 358 S.C. 133, 153,594 S.E.2d 499,509 (Anderson, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
135. See supra Part IV.C.1.
136. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTs:ARTIFICiALCONDITIONSHIGHLYDANGEROUS
To TRESPASSING CHILDREN § 339 cmt b. (1965) ("At one time [courts often required that a child be
attracted onto the defendant's premises by the particular condition which injured him. Although] this
position had considerable acceptance... it is now generally rejected."); KEETON, supra note 18, at 401
(commenting that the classical version of the doctrine "has now been rejected by a large majority of
courts, and there remain only a handful of jurisdictions which still adhere to it.").
137. See supra Part IV.C.2.
138. See supra Part IV.C.2.
139. See supra Part IV.C.2.
140. See supra Part IV.C.2.
141. Further, one of the majority's supportive cases was not decided by the supreme court, but
rather the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina.
142. See supra Part IV.C.2.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 339 cmt. b.
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majority's position in Henson.'" Likewise, the probability that the Kirven court
intended to overrule the cases conflicting with the Britt rule is slim; Kirven cited
one of the cases on which the dissent relied for its interpretation of the attractive
nuisance doctrine. 4"
In sum, the dissent's contention that South Carolina has never recognized the
Hancock rule is off base, since the majority's conclusion is supported by two post-
Hancock cases.'46 However, the comparatively large number of cases that do not
inquire how the injured child arrived on the defendant's property, when such an
inquiry would bar recovery, supports Judge Anderson's dissent."47 Evaluating these
competing strengths and weaknesses leads to the conclusion that the case law
surrounding Hancock is conflicted at best. Therefore, other factors must be
considered when determining whether to follow the Henson majority or Judge
Anderson's interpretation of South Carolina attractive nuisance jurisprudence. One
such determinative factor is the practical workability of the doctrine as articulated
by both the majority and dissent.
D. The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, as Described by Kirven and the Henson
Majority, Is Inherently Contradictory
One of the dissent's most compelling arguments centers on the "contrariety" of
the attractive nuisance doctrine as described by the Kirven court. 4 ' The dissent
focuses on the court's recitation of the prerequisites for maintaining an attractive
nuisance action. The Kirven court held that:
[I]t is necessary that the condition or instrumentality which caused
the injury, should have actually attracted the child into danger. It
follows that the doctrine is not applicable where the injured child
went into the dangerous situation for some other reason. In
Hancock.... we held that unless the child goes on the property
by reason of the temptation of the very instrumentality.. . he
cannot recover. 1
49
Judge Anderson wrote, "[h]ad the Court stopped its commentary [at the first
sentence], I would be in total agreement, as this is a correct
interpretation ... . However, the Court went on to quote the language from
Hancock.. . ."' 5 These comments indicate that the two sentences are in direct
conflict, and Judge Anderson uses the facts from Henson to illustrate his point.
Explicably, the "instrumentality which caused the
injury... actually attracted the child to the danger." .... Terry
was attracted to the pipe bridge, and it was the accessibility of this
pipe bridge, coupled with the latent dangerousness of the water in
144. Id.
145. Both Kirven and the dissent cite to Lynch v. Motel Enterprises, Inc., 248 S.C. 490, 515
S.E.2d 435 (1966).
146. See supra discussion in Part IV.C.3.
147. See supra discussion in Part IV.C.1.
148. Henson v. Int'l Paper Co., 358 S.C. 133, 154, 594 S.E.2d 499, 510 (Ct. App. 2004)
(Anderson, J., dissenting).
149. Kirven v. Askins, 253 S.C. 110, 117, 169 S.E.2d 139, 142 (1969) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
150. Henson, 358 S.C. at 154, 594 S.E.2d at 510 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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the canal, that created the danger. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that Terry went into the dangerous situation, i.e., onto
the pipe bridge and into the water, "for any other reason" than his
attraction to the water.1
5'
Alternatively, if the second proposition is followed, the fact
that Terry was attracted to the dangerous condition has no
consequence whatsoever even if IPC knew children often
frequented the property. Once it is determined Terry and his
friends entered the property without the canal in mind, the
analysis ends. To follow this position would undermine nearly
every case decided to date in South Carolina.
52
Judge Anderson's exposure of these two conflicting sentences in Kirven
illustrates the same problem in what the majority offers, as well as settled law. The
majority puts forth the following in denying the plaintiff's recovery:
When viewed in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], the
evidence shows Terry was not attracted to the premises by reason
of the canal. He went there for another purpose entirely, i.e., to
see "a dirt jumping hill." The attractive nuisance doctrine "is not
applicable where the injured child went to the dangerous situation
for some other reason."
153
The majority's decision reveals the contradictory statements of law. These two
sentences, much like those in Kirven, do not agree.
Under the majority's first sentence, Terry could not and does not recover."
However, in trying to further extrapolate the doctrine, the majority inadvertently and
indirectly allows Terry a basis for recovery. If the inverse of the second sentence
is true-that the doctrine is applicable when the injured child went to the dangerous
situation due to his attraction to it-then Terry would be able to recover as his
injury occurred at the canal, the dangerous situation he was attracted to. The
majority's interchanging of "premises" and "dangerous situation" lends support to
the dissent's position on Kirven and makes Judge Anderson's contrariety exposure
applicable in Henson.
Showing the contradictions in the Kirven and Hancock tests illustrate that if
such tests are followed in forthcoming cases, the results will differ with no element
of predictability. 55 It also tends to show that the Hancock and Kirven courts'
attractive nuisance analysis were laden with confusion. This undercuts the
majority's reliance on the cases as statements of South Carolina common law and
tends to support Judge Anderson's conclusion that the attractive nuisance test, as
stated in these cases, should not be followed.
151. Id. at 155, 594 S.E.2d at 510 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
152. Id. (Anderson, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 139-40, 594 S.E.2d at 502 (quoting Kirven, 253 S.C. at 117, 169 S.E.2d at 142)
(emphasis added).
154. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
155. In fact, using the rules enunciated in Hancock and Britt interchangeably in the preceding
Parts of this Note is probably technically incorrect as the Britt decision does not include the
contradicting second sentence present in Hancock.
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V. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SECTION 339: THE RIGHT DOCTRINE FOR
SOUTH CAROLINA
In many tragic stories, such as this one involving Terry Henson, the human
tendency is to believe that the law should afford the family of a dead child a remedy
when the child's death resulted from some unreasonable act or omission by the
defendant. The law sometimes does not follow this human inclination and instead
allows results that some may classify as harsh. These legal outcomes, while
appearing unwarranted or unfair, usually are reached in order to prevent further, or
greater, injustice in subsequent cases decided on different facts-thus, serving a
utilitarian function. Times exist, however, when both the law's utilitarian function
and its quest for justice can be achieved. The case ofHenson v. InternationalPaper
Co. is one of those times. The South Carolina Supreme Court should overrule the
court of appeals' decision for a number of reasons.
First, the majority bases its articulation of the attractive nuisance doctrine on
little more than dictum.""6 The majority in Henson relies on a statement in
Hancock, subsequently followed by Kirven, which was not necessary to decide the
case. The Hancock court already determined that the instrument causing the child's
harm was not an attractive nuisance and would not subject the defendant to liability
when it added the language on which the Henson majority relied. 57 While difficult
to discount this language as careless, since the Hancock court subsequently cited
nine Britt-type decisions, any offense to stare decisis would be minimal, since the
outcome-determinative portion of the decision was already stated'5:
Second, of approximately fifteen South Carolina attractive nuisance cases, the
two cited by the majority are the only two that arguably put forth the test enunciated
in Britt."9 While evident that Judge Anderson's assertion that South Carolina has
never followed the rule in Britt is incorrect, Perrin and Timmons show that the rule
has never been consistently followed. 60 In fact, the supreme court easily could
reverse the court of appeals. The statements of law in Hancock and Kirven are not
reflected by any other supreme court case decided in the past 100 years.
Third, almost all other jurisdictions reject the majority's statement of law and
adopt the section 339 approach. Comment b to the Restatement states that section
339 is "now accepted by the great majority of the American courts [and is only]
rejected in seven or eight jurisdictions .... "161 To continue this approach would
be to move away from the modem trend and take a step back towards 1920s
American jurisprudence.
Fourth, and most importantly, there exists a more balanced alternative to the
antiquated Britt rule. Under this alternative, defendants are not unfairly asked to
"be an insurer of children's safety"'62 and children are afforded a remedy if they are
injured as a result of a defendant's negligence. The section 339 negligence
156. See supra Part IV.B.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 cmt. b. The reporter's note to section 339
breaks jurisdictions into three categories: the "small minority" of courts that reject the section (Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Vermont), the smaller
minority, including South Carolina, that still follow Britt (Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, South Carolina, and Tennessee), and the remaining "great majority" that reject Britt and
follow section 339. Id.
162. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 499.
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standard 163 strikes the perfect balance between a landowner's autonomy and the
state's public policy consideration of protecting children. It breaks down the
"legalistic and protective" barrier"' for defendants while reserving punishment only
for those that act negligently in maintaining their property. Under the Restatement
approach, defendants would be better able to introduce evidence about the
likelihood of a child's trespass, the potential costs of keeping children off the
property, and other mitigating factors in attempting to show an exercise of due care.
On the other hand, a section 339 standard would provide children with a means
of recovery when they should be afforded one. In cases such as Perrin, Daniels,
and Henson, children would be allowed a recovery when a defendant has notice of
the dangerousness of the property and when a defendant knows that children are
likely to frequent the property. Children would be protected from negligent
landowners without having to prove their subjective intent for entering the property.
In Henson, the defendant knew of three other drownings in the canal but failed to
put up warning signs.16 The adoption of the modem rule would require landowners
to take due care in maintaining their property in a way to prevent tragedy even for
trespassers.
Section 339 has become the majority rule in the United States because it serves
the same function as the original attractive nuisance doctrine. The rigid
classifications of invitee, licensee, and trespasser are disbanded, and a child is given
more protection by the law. This increased protection is appropriate because a child
is less able to appreciate dangers inherent in instrumentalities such as canals and is
usually incognizant of the fact that entry onto another person's land is trespassing.
Section 339 effectively tempers these concerns for trespassing children with
protections for defendant landowners who should not be required to "be an insurer
of children's safety."' Since section 339 produces this effective balance and
would provide South Carolina courts with a workable formula in child trespass
cases, and since previous South Carolina attractive nuisance decisions are
hopelessly conflicted, the South Carolina Supreme Court should reverse the court
of appeals decision in Henson and remand the case for a determination of IPC's
liability based on the factors enunciated in section 339.
Eric R. Tonnsen
163. The section provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children
trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor
knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know
and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death
or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area
made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden
of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children
involved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or
otherwise to protect the children.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339.
164. Henson v. Int'l Paper Co., 358 S.C. 133, 157, 594 S.E.2d 499, 511 (Ct. App. 2004)
(Anderson, J., dissenting).
165. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
166. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 499.
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